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ANSELM AND RUSSELL

Abstract. In his paper “St. Anselm’s ontological argument succumbs to Russell’s paradox” Christopher Viger presents a critique of Anselm’s Argument from the second chapter of *Proslogion*. Viger claims there that he manages to show that the *greater than* relation that Anselm used in his proof leads to inconsistency. I argue firstly, that Viger does not show what he maintains to show, secondly, that the flaw is not in the nature of Anselm’s reasoning but in Viger’s (mis)understanding of Anselm as well as in Viger’s (mis)application of some set-theoretical notions. I also describe some features of Anselmian *greater than* relation, which indeed plays a crucial role in his Ontological Argument. Last but not least, I present the Argument itself.

Keywords: ontological argument, St. Anselm, Russell’s Paradox, ontology